Center for Positive Organizational Scholarship

Ross School of Business

HomePOS ResearchCommunity of ScholarsKarl E. Weick
Karl E. Weick

Rensis Likert Distinguished University Professor of Organizational Behavior and Psychology
Professor of Psychology
University of Michigan
karlw@umich.edu


My work on the conditions that precipitate a collapse of sensemaking in organizations, initially looks like the very kind of work that positive psychologists such as Seligman want to counteract. The work is partly about adversity, error, failure, and pathology. But I emphasize the qualifier “partly.” There are facets of this work that can help in the consolidation and articulation of positive organizational scholarship. Collective tragedies such as wildland firefighting fatalities, excess deaths in pediatric surgery, and airline disasters get organized in part when people cling to plausible optimistic interpretations of what is unfolding, and shield these emerging stories from additional cues that suggest a darker, more uncertain trajectory. From this perspective, the study of positive psychology does look initially like an examination of the perverse conditions that lure people to become entrapped by optimism. People who get entrapped by optimism may well postpone their continuing search for darker stories of threat and danger that enable them to take preemptive action.

If optimism has the potential to augment the organizing of a tragedy, and if wariness and doubt and suspicion have the potential to forestall tragedy, then positivity is more complicated than it first appears. If we take a closer look at those complications then we may improve our understanding of positive experience.

Specifically, the juxtaposition of tragedy and triumph forged by struggles for alertness that fail and produce fatalities, may reveal an invisible infrastructure of virtue. In the case of tragedies in wildland firefighting, for example, virtue lies in such unexpected places as containment of further damage in the unfolding tragedy (e.g. pulling 2 campers inside one’s single person fire shelter), provision of pathways for recovery (e.g. crews burn out a new safety zone when more firefighters are assigned to an active fire), respectful interactions that forestall panic reactions (e.g. people converse over radios while in fire shelters as fire passes overhead), experimenting that holds promise but is rendered incomplete by the rush of events (e.g. deploying fire shelter on rocks but unable to get a good seal because rocks turn out to be too uneven), doing the right thing but without the credibility necessary to convince others (e.g. inventing an escape fire that would save lives but that everyone avoids), reaffirming an identity that creates cohesion and pride but complicates the meaning of a failure to disengage (e.g. firefighter dies ‘with his boots on’), candor rather than concealment about foul-ups thereby focusing attention on key conditions that did have causal impact (e.g. I should never have handed over this fire in the heat of the day), and validating the importance of feeling as a guide to action (e.g. when my gut told me that this fire ‘feels dicey’ I should have been more insistent when I expressed that feeling). Woven into many tragedies are moments of human strength and resilience. These moments do not neutralize the blunt fact that we are talking about failures and fatalities. But they do suggest that there is more to be learned from those tragic events, and more leads for positive organizing, than we may realize.